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Abstract
In this work, we are interested in finding the most
efficient use of a budget to promote an opinion by
paying agents within a group to supplant their true
opinions. We model opinions as continuous scalars
ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0) representing extremely
positive (negative) opinion. We focus on asymmetric
confidence between agents. The iterative update of
an agent corresponds to the best response to other
agents’ actions. The resulting confidence matrix can
be seen as an equivalent Markov chain. We provide
simple and efficient algorithms to solve this problem
and we show through an example how to solve the
stated problem in practice.
1 Introduction
The process of interpersonal influence that affects
agents’ opinions is an important foundation of their
socialization and identity. This process can produce
shared understandings and agreements that define
the culture of the group. The question that we are
trying to answer here is how hard or costly can it be
for an external entity to change the largest propor-
tion of opinions of a group by supplanting the true
opinions of some agents within the group.
Starting from an initial distribution of continuous
opinions in a network of interacting agents and agents
behaving according to the best-response dynamics,
our objective is to efficiently supplant the opinions of
some agents to drive the largest proportion of opin-
∗Email: alonso.silva@nokia-bell-labs.com To whom corre-
spondence should be addressed.
ions towards a target set of values. In particular, we
are interested to maximize the expected number of
agents with an opinion of at least certain threshold
value.
Related Work
A coordination game is played between the agents in
which adopting a common strategy has a lower cost.
When the confidence matrix is a row-stochastic ma-
trix, it can be seen as an equivalent Markov chain.
When the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic,
[3] gives sufficient conditions for convergence to a con-
sensus. There is a growing literature on social learn-
ing using a Bayesian perspective (see e.g. [1]). Our
model belongs to the non-Bayesian framework, which
keeps the computations tractable. [10] studies binary
0-1 opinion dynamics. Here, we study the continu-
ous opinion dynamics where the opinion belongs to a
bounded interval. Our work is mostly related to [7]
in the case of no stubborn agents. However, in [7]
the interactions between agents are symmetric and
the cost for each agent of differing with its interact-
ing agents is the same. Our work is also related to
consensus problems [6] in which the question of in-
terest is whether beliefs (some scalar numbers) held
by different agents will converge to a common value.
Our contributions
We study opinion dynamics in the directed graph in-
stead of the undirected graph. In our opinion, this
scenario is more realistic since when an agent influ-
ences another agent it doesn’t mean that the latter
influences the former. This directed graph will be
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edge-weighted since we consider different costs for an
agent of differing with each of its interacting agents.
Agents iteratively update their opinions based on
their best-response dynamics which are given by a lin-
ear dynamic system. The confidence matrix describ-
ing the opinion dynamics can be seen as an equiva-
lent Markov chain and by decomposing the states of
this equivalent Markov chain between transient and
recurrent states, we show that in the case we have
only recurrent states the problem can be reduced
to a knapsack problem which can be approximated
through an FPTAS scheme. In the presence of tran-
sient states, the problem can be reduced to a Mixed
Integer Linear Programming problem which in gen-
eral is NP-hard but for which there are efficient im-
plementations. We show through an example how to
solve this problem in practice.
Organization of the work
The work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
provide the definitions and introduce the model. In
Section 3, we provide the main results of our work.
In Section 4, we give an example to explain how the
problem can be solved in practice. We conclude our
work in Section 5.
2 Model and Definitions
Consider a group of n agents, denoted by
I = {1, . . . , n}. For simplicity, we consider that each
agent’s opinion can be represented over the inter-
val [0, 1]. For example, they could represent people’s
opinions about the current government with an opin-
ion 1 corresponding to perfect satisfaction with the
current government and 0 representing an extremely
negative view towards the current government. In
this work, we consider a synchronous version of the
problem where time is slotted and each agent’s opin-
ion will be given by xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for t = 1, 2, . . . We
have a budget B ≥ 0 and we want to efficiently use
this budget to pay some agents to favor either a pos-
itive (closest to 1) or negative (closest to 0) opinion
over the group of agents. Without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g.), we consider that we are promoting opin-
ions closest to 1. In the previous example, it would
correspond to promote positive opinions towards the
current government. We want to supplant the opin-
ions of some agents in order to change the opinion
of the largest proportion of the population. We con-
sider a threshold opinion given by x∗ that we would
like that the largest proportion of the population at
least has. In the previous example, it could be the
threshold to have an approving or at least neutral
opinion of the current government (x∗ = 1/2) or the
threshold to actually register and go to vote in the
next election which we could consider to be much
higher than 1/2 (e.g. x∗ = 3/5). Agents who have
an opinion greater or equal to the threshold are called
supporters. If every agent is a supporter, i.e. it has
an opinion greater or equal than x∗, the problem is
trivial since even without spending any budget we
have succeeded in achieving our goal. The problem
gets interesting when there are agents who have opin-
ions smaller than x∗. The focus of the present work
is on the asymptotic opinions of the agents. In other
words, we would like to maximize
|{i ∈ I : xi(+∞) ≥ x
∗}|,
where |·| denotes the set’s cardinality.
We assume that there will be a cost (which will de-
pend on the agent) for changing the agent’s opinion.
In the present work, we consider that the payments
have to be done at only one time t0 and without loss
of generality we consider that t0 = 0. To differenti-
ate between the true opinion and the expressed (after
payment) opinion, we denote the true opinion by xˆi
and the expressed opinion by xi. We assume that the
payment we need to give to agent i to change its true
opinion from xˆi(0) to the expressed opinion xi(0) is
given by
pi = ci(xi(0)− xˆi(0)). (1)
The budget constraint is given by∑
i∈I
pi ≤ B.
Our objective is to solve the following problem:
Maximize |{i ∈ I : xi(+∞) ≥ x
∗}|,
subject to
∑
i∈I
pi ≤ B,
(P1)
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where part of the problem is to discover the depen-
dence between the asymptotic opinions of the agents
{xi(+∞) : i ∈ I} and the payments {pi : i ∈ I}.
We consider a weighted directed graph of the n
agents, denoted by G = (I, E , w), where each vertex
corresponds to an agent and each edge is an ordered
pair of vertices (i, j) ∈ E ⊆ I × I which indicates
that agent i takes into account, or considers relevant,
the opinion of agent j. We notice that this isn’t nec-
essarily a symmetric relationship, for this reason we
consider a directed graph.
In the following, we focus on one of the agents and
discuss how this agent may change its opinion when
it is informed of the (expressed) opinions of other
agents.
We assume each agent i ∈ I has an individual cost
function of the form
Ji(xi(t),Ni) =
1
2
∑
j∈Ni
wij(xi(t)− xj(t))
2,
where Ni := {j ∈ I : (i, j) ∈ E} is the neighborhood
of i ∈ I and we assume that the weights wij are
nonnegative for all i, j ∈ N and not all zeros for each
i ∈ I. The objective for each agent is to minimize its
individual cost function.
The above formulation defines a coordination game
with continuous payoffs [7] because any vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) with x1 = x2 = . . . = xn is a Nash equi-
librium. We consider that at each time step, every
agent observes the opinion of its neighbors and up-
dates its opinion based on these observations in order
to minimize its individual cost function.
It is easy to check that for every agent i ∈ I, its
best-response strategy is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
1
Wi
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t),
where Wi =
∑
j∈Ni
wij . We notice that this extends
the work of Ghaderi and Srikant [7] in the case of no
stubborn agents, where they consider an undirected
graph and the cost of differing to be the same across
all neighbors (wij = 1 for all i, j).
Define the confidence matrix A = [Aij ] where
Aij =
{ wij
Wi
if (i, j) ∈ E ,
0 otherwise.
Therefore, in matrix form, the best response dynam-
ics are given by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t), (2)
where x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) is the vector of
opinions at time t.
We notice that A is a row-stochastic matrix since
every element Aij is nonnegative and the sum of the
elements in any given row is 1. The entry Aij can be
interpreted as the weight (or confidence) that agent
i ∈ I gives to the opinion of agent j ∈ I. In the
following, we make the assumption that each agent
has a little bit of self-confidence.
Assumption [Self-confidence]: We say that the dy-
namical system (2) has self-confidence if the diago-
nal of A is strictly positive. For every agent i ∈ I,
Aii > 0 or equivalently wii > 0.
It is assumed that the agents of the group continue
to make the revisions given by (2) indefinitely or until
x(t + 1) = x(t) for some t such that further revision
doesn’t actually change their opinions.
Since A is a row-stochastic matrix, it can be seen as
a one-step transition probability matrix of a Markov
chain with n states and stationary transition proba-
bilities. Therefore the theory of Markov chains can
be applied.
We recall some basic definitions from Markov
chains which will be used afterwards. In the follow-
ing j will be called a consequent of i (of order n),
relative to a given stochastic matrix, if Anij > 0 for
some n ≥ 1. The states of the Markov chain 1, . . . , n
can be divided into two classes as follows:
• a transient state is one which has a consequent
of which it is not itself a consequent;
• a recurrent state is one which is a consequent of
every one of its consequents.
In the following, F will be the class of transient states.
The recurrent states can be further divided into er-
godic classes, E1, E2, . . ., by putting two states in the
same class if they are consequent of each other (see
e.g. [5], p. 179). Then, if i ∈ Ek, Anij = 0 for all
j /∈ Ek, n ≥ 1. Remember that if i ∈ F , then at least
one of its consequents lies in an ergodic class.
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The decomposition of the states of the equiva-
lent Markov chain can be accomplished (see [4]) in
O(max(|V |, |E|)). In the following, F represents the
class of nT transient states. We can further decom-
pose the class of recurrent states into E1, E2, . . . , Em
for some m ≤ n, corresponding to the ergodic classes
of the recurrent states (see e.g. [5], p. 179). The states
of the equivalent Markov chain are aperiodic (under
the self-confidence assumption). We denote by Ek
the sub-matrix of A representing the subgraph Ek of
the ergodic class k, composed by nk states. Obvi-
ously, n1 + n2 + . . .+ nm + nT = n.
3 Results
3.1 Dynamical Systems Without
Transient States
We focus into one of the subgraphs described by sub-
matrix Ek. For a subset S ⊆ I we denote by 1S
the 0/1 vector, whose i-the entry is 1 iff i ∈ S and
(·)′ denotes the transpose operator. Let’s denote π(k)
the normalized (i.e. 1′Ekπ
(k) = 1) left eigenvector of
Ek associated with eigenvalue 1. It is well-known
(see e.g. [5], p. 182) that the equilibrium for the er-
godic class under dynamics (2) is unique and that the
agents of the ergodic class k will reach a consensus
(all opinions are eventually the same) where
xi(+∞) =
∑
j∈Ek
π
(k)
j xj(0) for all i ∈ Ek. (3)
Therefore π
(k)
j can be interpreted as the influence of
agent j within its ergodic class k.
From eq. (1), we have that
xi(0) = xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
.
If we focus on ergodic class k, the problem of what is
the minimum budget to make the consensus opinion
of the ergodic class to be higher than a threshold x∗
becomes
Minimize Pk :=
∑
i∈Ek
pi
subject to
∑
i∈Ek
π
(k)
i
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
)
≥ x∗,
0 ≤
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
)
≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Ek,
and pi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Ek.
(P2)
Reordering the states (which can be done through
any efficient sorting procedure in O(|V | log|V |) see
e.g. [2]), we can assume w.l.o.g. that
π
(k)
1
c1
≥
π
(k)
2
c2
≥ . . . ≥
π
(k)
nk
cnk
,
and denoting the critical item of ergodic class k as
s = min

j ∈ Ek :
j∑
i=1
π
(k)
i +
n∑
i=j+1
π
(k)
i xˆi(0) ≥ x
∗

 ,
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The optimal solution p¯ =
(p¯1, p¯2. . . . , p¯nk) is given by
p¯j =
{
cj(1− xˆj(0)) for j = 1, . . . , s− 1,
0 for j = s+ 1, . . . , nk,
p¯s =
cs
π
(k)
s

x∗ − s−1∑
j=1
π
(k)
j −
nk∑
j=s
π
(k)
j xˆj(0)

 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 tell us to select the agent i with the
highest (πk)i/ci and to put it to the maximum pos-
sible value. We notice that by selecting the i with
the highest (πk)i/ci we are selecting the agent whose
influence-to-cost ratio is minimum.
From Theorem 1, the optimal value P¯k =
∑
i∈Ek
p¯i
of (P2) is given by
P¯k =
s−1∑
j=1
cj(1− xˆj(0))+
+
cs
π
(k)
s

x∗ − s−1∑
j=1
π
(k)
j −
nk∑
j=s
π
(k)
j xˆj(0)

 .
(4)
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Therefore, for each ergodic class k we have the pay-
ment P¯k, given by eq. (4), we need to make to obtain
nk agents having an opinion greater or equal than x
∗.
More importantly, these payments {P¯k : 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
are independent between them in the sense that each
payment affects only the ergodic class where the pay-
ment was made.
In other words, the problem (P1) is equivalent to
determine {zk} where
zk =
{
1 if class k is selected
0 otherwise
(5)
in order to
Maximize
m∑
k=1
zknk
subject to
m∑
k=1
zkP¯k ≤ B
and zk ∈ {0, 1}.
(P2’)
This is the classic 0-1 knapsack problem, and thus
we can use the well-known linear time FPTAS1 algo-
rithm of Knapsack [8] to obtain a FPTAS to prob-
lem (P1).
3.2 Dynamical Systems With Tran-
sient States
For the recurrent states, the previous analysis still
holds. For the transient states, we need to use dif-
ferent properties of Markov chains. From subsec-
tion (3.1), we know that the equilibrium for each er-
godic class under dynamics (2) is unique and that
agents within each ergodic class will reach a consen-
sus where
xi(+∞) =
∑
j∈Ek
π
(k)
j xj(0) for all i ∈ Ek.
We denote
Ok :=
∑
j∈Ek
π
(k)
j xj(0)
1 An FPTAS, short for Fully Polynomial Time Approxima-
tion Scheme, is an algorithm that for any ε approximates the
optimal solution up to an error (1 + ε) in time poly(n/ε).
the consensus opinion of ergodic class k. We know
that the system will remain among the transient
states through only a finite number of transitions,
with probability 1 (see e.g. [5], p. 180). Moreover, we
have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The equilibrium for a transient
state i ∈ F (see e.g. [5], p. 182) under dynamics (2)
is unique and given by
xi(∞) =
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok, (6)
where h
(k)
i denotes the hitting probability of the re-
current ergodic class Ek starting from i ∈ I.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The hitting probabilities for each ergodic class can
be calculated from simple linear equations (see [9], p.
13):
h
(k)
i = 1 for i ∈ Ek,
h
(k)
i =
∑
j∈I
Aijh
(k)
j for i /∈ Ek.
(7)
From eq. (3) and eq. (6), we notice that the only
opinions which affect the asymptotic opinions of the
recurrent and the transient states are the opinions
coming from the recurrent states, therefore in the
optimum the payments will be zero for every tran-
sient state pt = 0, ∀t ∈ F . The hitting probabilities
of ergodic class k starting from state i ∈ Ej are given
by
h
(k)
i =
{
1 if j = k,
0 otherwise.
The hitting probabilities of ergodic class k starting
from state i ∈ F are calculated from eq. (7). There-
fore, problem (P1) becomes
Max
∑
i∈I
I
[(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i
∑
i∈Ek
π
(k)
i
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
))
− x∗
]
where I(s) =
{
1 if s ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
subject to the budget constraint
∑
i∈I
pi ≤ B.
(P3)
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Defining
L := min
i∈I
(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i
∑
i∈Ek
π
(k)
i xˆi(0)
)
, (8)
problem (P3) is equivalent to the following formula-
tion:
Maximize
∑
i∈I
zi
subject to
−
(∑m
k=1 h
(k)
i
∑
i∈Ek
π
(k)
i
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
))
− x∗
L− x∗
+ 1 ≥ zi,
0 ≤
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
)
≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Ek,∑
i∈I
pi ≤ B,
and zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I.
(P3’)
Indeed,
I
[(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
]
= 0,
⇔
(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗ < 0,
⇔ −
(∑m
k=1 h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
L− x∗
< 0,
From (P3’),
−
(∑m
k=1 h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
L− x∗
+ 1 ≥ zi,
implies that zi < 1 and zi ∈ {0, 1} implies that
zi = 0.
Similarly,
I
[(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
]
= 1,
⇔
(
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗ ≥ 0,
⇔ −
(∑m
k=1 h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
L− x∗
+ 1 ≥ 1,
From (P3’),
−
(∑m
k=1 h
(k)
i Ok
)
− x∗
L− x∗
+ 1 ≥ zi,
implies that zi ≤ 1 but since we are maximizing the
objective function we have that zi = 1.
The system of equations (P3’) is a mixed inte-
ger programming problem which is NP-hard, however
many software (see e.g. AMPL, R) can solve them
quite efficiently. In the illustrative example, we use
the programming language R.
4 Illustrative Example
Consider as inputs:
• the confidence matrix given by the coefficients
in Fig. 1, where the self-loops were not added
but their coefficients can be computed since the
outgoing edges sum to 1;
• the initial opinions of the agents
xˆ = (0.5, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1, 0.6, 0.7, 0.3, 0.1, 0.8, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4);
• the cost (in dollars) to change their opinions by
+0.1 given by
c = (100, 80, 120, 60, 20, 100, 80, 120, 60, 20, 90, 70);
• the target opinion x∗ = 1/2
• and a budget (in dollars).
Our objective is to determine the most efficient use
of the budget to maximize the number of agents who
have an opinion of at least x∗ (supporters).
Solution
We can decompose the system in:
• transient states F = {d, e, f, g, h},
• ergodic class E1 = {a, b, c}, and
• ergodic class E2 = {i, j, k, l}.
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The ergodic class E1 = {a, b, c} is given as in Fig. 2.
The matrix E1 is given by the coefficients in Fig. 2.
E1 =


a b c
a 0.7 0.3 0
b 0 0.6 0.4
c 0.5 0 0.5


The stationary distribution π(1) =
(
π
(1)
a , π
(1)
b , π
(1)
c
)′
for ergodic class E1 is the solution of the system of
equations
(π(1))TE1 = (π
(1))T ,
π(1)a + π
(1)
b + π
(1)
c = 1.
Therefore
π(1) =
(
20
47
,
15
47
,
12
47
)′
.
The ergodic class E2 = {i, j, k, l} is given as in
Fig. 3. The matrix E2 is given by the coefficients
in Fig. 3.
E2 =


i j k l
i 0.8 0.2 0 0
j 0 0.8 0 0.2
k 0.2 0 0.8 0
l 0 0 0.2 0.8


Similarly, the stationary distribution π(2) =(
π
(2)
i , π
(2)
j , π
(2)
k , π
(2)
l
)′
for ergodic class E2 is given by
the solution of the system of equations
(π(2))TE2 = (π
(2))T ,
π
(2)
i + π
(2)
j + π
(2)
k + π
(2)
l = 1.
Therefore
π(2) =
(
π
(2)
i , π
(2)
j , π
(2)
k , π
(2)
l
)′
=
(
5
39
,
20
39
,
10
39
,
4
39
)′
.
From eq. (7), the hitting probabilities h(1) =(
h
(1)
a , h
(1)
b , . . . , h
(1)
l
)
to class E1 are given by the equa-
tions
h(1)a = h
(1)
b = h
(1)
c = 1;
h
(1)
i = h
(1)
j = h
(1)
k = h
(1)
l = 0;
and
3
5
h
(1)
d =
2
5
+
1
5
h
(1)
f ;
2
5
h(1)e =
1
5
+
1
5
h(1)g ;
1
2
h
(1)
f =
3
10
h
(1)
d +
1
5
h(1)e ;
2
5
h(1)g =
1
5
h(1)e ,
4
5
h
(1)
h =
1
5
h
(1)
f +
1
5
h(1)g .
Therefore
h(1) =
(
1, 1, 1,
17
18
,
2
3
,
5
6
,
1
3
,
7
24
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
.
Since there are only two recurrent classes, the hit-
ting probabilities h(2) =
(
h
(2)
a , h
(2)
b , . . . , h
(2)
l
)
to class
E2 are given by
h(2) =
(
0, 0, 0,
1
18
,
1
3
,
1
6
,
2
3
,
17
24
, 1, 1, 1, 1
)
.
Replacing the previous quantities and solving the
Mixed Integer Linear Programming problem (P3’) in
R, we obtain Fig. 4 plotting the number of supporters
with respect to the budget. In the optimum there are
only two agents who receive payments: agent a and
agent j. The other agents receive zero. The optimal
payments are
Budget pa pj Number of supporters
99 99 4
114 114 5
117 117 6
169 169 7
293 113 180 8
309 210 99 12
Number of supporters Supporters
4 {i, j, k, l}
5 {h, i, j, k, l}
6 {g, h, i, j, k, l}
7 {e, g, h, i, j, k, l}
8 {e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l}
12 {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l}
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5 Conclusions
We have studied continuous opinion dynamics with
asymmetric confidence. The confidence matrix can
be seen as a Markov chain and by decomposing the
states between transient and recurrent states, we
proved that in the case we have only recurrent states
the problem can be reduced to a knapsack problem,
and in the presence of transient states, the problem
can be reduced to a Mixed-Integer Linear Program-
ming problem. We gave an illustrative example on
how to solve this problem.
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A Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Any optimal solution p = (p1, p2, . . . , pnk)
must be maximal in the sense that
∑
i∈Ek
π
(k)
i
(
xˆi(0) +
pi
ci
)
= x∗.
Assume without loss of generality that
π
(k)
j
cj
>
π
(k)
j+1
cj+1
∀j ∈ Ek
and let p∗ be the optimal solution of (P2). Suppose,
by absurdity, that for some ℓ < s, p∗ℓ < cℓ(1 + xˆℓ(0)),
then we must have p∗q > p¯q for at least one item
q ≥ s. Given a sufficiently small ε > 0, we
could increase the value of p∗ℓ by ε and decrease the
value of p∗q by ε
π
(k)
ℓ
cℓ
cq
π
(k)
q
, thus diminishing the value
of the objective function by ε
(
π
(k)
ℓ
cℓ
cq
π
(k)
q
− 1
)
> 0
which is a contradiction. Similarly, we can prove
that p∗ℓ > 0 for ℓ > s is impossible. Hence
p¯s =
cs
π
(k)
s
(
x∗ −
∑s−1
j=1 π
(k)
j −
∑nk
j=s π
(k)
j xˆj(0)
)
for
maximality.
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B Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We first recall the definition of hitting proba-
bilities. Let (Xn)n≥0 be a Markov chain with tran-
sition matrix A. The first hitting time of a subset
E ⊆ I is the random variable
τE (w) = inf{n ≥ 0 : Xn(w) ∈ E},
where we agree that the infimum of the empty set
is +∞. The hitting probability starting from i that
(Xn)n≥0 ever hits E is given by
hEi = Pi(τ
E < +∞). (9)
In order to simplify the notation, we denote the hit-
ting probability of ergodic class k as
h
(k)
i := h
Ek
i .
Under the self-confidence assumption, if j ∈ Ek we
have that (see e.g. [5], p. 180)
lim
ℓ→+∞
Aℓij = ρi(Ek)π
(k)
j (10)
where
ρi(Ek) = lim
n→+∞
∑
j∈Ek
Anij .
Considering the equivalent Markov chain, we have
that
ρi(Ek) = lim
n→+∞
∑
j∈Ek
Pi(Xn(w) ∈ j)
= lim
n→+∞
Pi(Xn(w) ∈ Ek). (11)
We have that the following equality of sets
{w : Xn(w) ∈ Ek} = {w : τ
Ek(w) ≤ n}. (12)
Therefore
ρi(Ek) = lim
n→+∞
Pi(Xn(w) ∈ Ek)
= lim
n→+∞
Pi(τ
Ek(w) ≤ n)
= Pi(τ
Ek(w) <∞)
= h
(k)
i
where the first equality is coming from eq. (11), the
second equality from eq. (12), and the last equation
from eq. (9). Replacing in eq. (10), if j ∈ Ek
lim
ℓ→+∞
Aℓij = h
(k)
i π
(k)
j .
Therefore
xi(+∞) = lim
ℓ→+∞
xi(ℓ + 1)
= lim
ℓ→+∞
∑
j∈I
Aℓijxj(0)
= lim
ℓ→+∞
∑
j∈F
Aℓijxj(0) + lim
ℓ→+∞
m∑
k=1
∑
j∈Ek
Aℓijxj(0)
=
m∑
k=1
∑
j∈Ek
lim
ℓ→+∞
Aℓijxj(0)
=
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i
∑
j∈Ek
π
(k)
j xj(0)
=
m∑
k=1
h
(k)
i Ok.
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Figures
Figure 1: Opinion Dynamics
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Figure 4: Number of supporters vs budget
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Inputs:
• The confidence matrix
A =


a b c d e f g h i j k l
a 0.7 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
e 0 0 0.2 0 0.6 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0
f 0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
g 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.6 0 0.2 0 0 0
h 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 0
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 0.1
k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.8 0
l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5


;
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• The initial true opinions of the agents
xˆ =
( a b c d e f g h i j k l
0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.4
)
;
• The costs to change their initial true opinions by +0.1
c =
( a b c d e f g h i j k l
100 80 120 60 20 100 80 120 60 20 90 70
)
;
• The target opinion x∗ = 1/2;
• A budget B (in dollars).
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